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Abstract. The need to explain the output from Machine Learning sys-
tems designed to predict the outcomes of legal cases has led to a renewed
interest in the explanations offered by traditional AI and Law systems,
especially those using factor based reasoning and precedent cases. In this
paper we consider what sort of explanations we should expect from such
systems, with a particular focus on the structure that can be provided
by the use of issues in cases.
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1 Introduction
Currently there is much interest in the use of Machine Learning (ML) based ap-
proaches to predict legal decisions. The European Convention on Human Rights
alone has been the subject of a cluster of such systems including [2], [37], [20],
[38] and [34]. Using such systems in legal applications, however, raises a number
of issues [9], including bias, adapting to changes in statute law, case law and
social values, and, perhaps most important, the lack of explanation. In law there
is a right to explanation [22] and so providing explanations that users can un-
derstand is essential if AI systems are to be used in practice. This has long been
recognised in AI and Law and the provision of explanations has been a central
feature of systems developed in the field [6]. It is therefore a natural move to
see whether it is possible to use the techniques developed to explain the outputs
of systems previously developed in AI and Law to explain the outputs of ML
systems. In particular the factor based reasoning developed for the CATO sys-
tem [3] and widely adopted in subsequent systems [7] has been proposed as a
suitable candidate for this role. In [17] the idea is to first ascribe factors to cases
using ML and then to explain the outcomes in terms of these factors. In [42],
the proposal is to produce the explanation from a case based system running in
parallel with the ML system.
In this paper we consider what sort of explanations we can expect from such
systems, with a particular focus on the structure that can be provided by the
use of issues in cases.
2 Background: Factor Based Reasoning in CATO
We begin by describing factor based reasoning in CATO [3], which is the starting
point for subsequent accounts of factor based reasoning [7]. CATO is directed
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Table 1. Factors in CATO. Numbers are as in [3]: “p” and “d” indicates the side
favoured as in [28]
Plaintiff Factors Defendant Factors
F2p Bribe-Employee F1d Disclosure-In-Negotiations
F4p Agreed-Not-To-Disclose F3d Employee-Sole-Developer
F6p Security-Measures F5d Agreement-not-specific
F7p Brought-Tools F10d Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders
F8p Competitive-Advantage F11d Vertical-Knowledge
F12p Outsider-Disclosures-Restricted F16d Info-Reverse-Engineerable
F13p Noncompetition-Agreement F17d Info-Independently-Generated
F14p Restricted-Materials-Used F19d No-Security-Measures
F15p Unique-Product F20d Info-Known-to-Competitors
F18p Identical-Products F23d Waiver-of-Confidentiality
F21p Knew-Info-Confidential F24d Info-Obtainable-Elsewhere
F22p Invasive-Techniques F25d Info-Reverse-Engineered
F26p Deception F27d Disclosure-In-Public-Forum
towards the domain of US Trade Secrets, and is largely based on the law as
set out in the Restatement of Torts1. In CATO cases are represented as sets
of factors. Factors are ascribed on the basis of stereotypical patterns of facts
which have legal significance in that they provide a reason to find for one of
the parties. CATO has thirteen factors for each side, as shown in Table 1. The
conditions for ascribing them to cases are given in Appendix 2 of [3]. Note that
the absence of a factor is not in general a reason to find for the other party: in
the rare cases where the absence of a factor might favour the other side, a second
distinct factor for the party favoured is used. The only example of this in CATO
is security measures with factors F6p and F19d. Note, however, that it may be
that neither F6p or F19d is present in the case: even if security measures were
taken, so that there is no reason to find for the defendant on this aspect, they
may not have been sufficient to provide a reason to find for the plaintiff, and
so that the aspect is neutral. The factors from [3] have been reused by many
subsequent researchers, including [19], [21], [1], [55] and [42].
When presented with a new case a three ply argument is constructed. In the
first ply a proponent cites the most-on-point precedent (i.e. the precedent with
the greatest overlap of factors irrespective of which side they favour) decided
for the side being argued for. Suppose this is the plaintiff. In the second ply the
opponent either cites a counterexample (a case which favours the defendant and
is at least as on point as the case cited by the plaintiff) or distinguishes the
precedent by pointing to a factor favouring the plaintiff in the precedent but not
the new case, or a factor favouring the defendant in the current case but not
the precedent. In the third ply the plaintiff offers a rebuttal by distinguishing
the counterexamples, or downplaying the distinguishing factor by pointing to a
1 The relevant section, section 757, Liability for disclosure or use of another’s Trade
Secret, can be found at https://www.lrdc.pitt.edu/ashley/restatem.htm.
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factor which can cancel the additional factor or a factor which can be substituted
for the absent factor [44].
CATO organised its factors into a factor hierarchy. At the upper level are
issues, and below these are layers of abstract factors before the leaf nodes are
reached. These leaf nodes are the base level factors shown in Table 1. The im-
portance of this hierarchy is for determining whether distinctions can be down-
played: a factor can only be substituted for or cancel another factor if they have
a common ancestor. The closer the ancestor the more persuasive the downplay.
How persuasive the downplay is matters for prediction, where the success or
otherwise of the rebuttal needs to be decided, but not for for explanation. The
success or otherwise of the rebuttal is given by the outcome of the case, which
shows whether or not the downplay was successful.
CATO’s factor based model has inspired a number of formal accounts of
precedential constraint [29], [33], [45] and [41]. These models are based on a
way of representing precedents originating in [43]. Suppose we have a case with
plaintiff factors P and defendant factors D. Now the strongest reason to find
for the plaintiff will be the conjunction of all the factors in P and the strongest
reason to find for the defendant the conjunction of all the factors in D. The
outcome of the case will show which reason was preferred. A decision is taken
to be constrained in these approaches if deciding for the other party would
introduce an inconsistency into the set of preferences in the precedent base2.
Using all the factors available for the winning side is termed the results model in
[29]. It may be, however, that a subset of the factors for the winning side is still
sufficient to overcome the reason for the losing side. This would allow a subset
of the winner’s factors to be used in the preference. This is termed the reason
model in [29]. A comparison of the two models is given in [41].
The reasoning in CATO: citation, distinguishing and counterexample, fol-
lowed by rebuttal through downplaying distinctions and distinguishing counter
examples was expressed as a set of argumentation schemes in [54] and formalised
in ASPIC+ in [44]. This formalisation uses the results model, and uses the full
set of factors available to both sides. These schemes were proposed as a means of
providing explanation for ML systems in [42]. We will discuss the explanations
from [42] in the next section.
3 Explanation with Argument Schemes
Explanation in [42] takes the form of a dialogue modelling the three ply argu-
mentation structure of CATO. An example dialogue is shown in Figure 1. Figure
1 illustrates a particular example used in [42]. The two precedent cases and the
new case in that example are shown in Table 2. The cases have been given
mnemonic names. The top layer, put forward by the proponent, is an argument
based on citing a precedent case. The second layer, objections by the opponent,
comprises objections based on each of the two types of distinction (O1a and
2 In practice this formal notion of constraint may not actually be respected in a given
judicial setting. For a jurisprudential discussion see [50].
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Fig. 1. Example Dialogue Tree From [42]
O1c), and a counter example (O1b). The final layer shows the proponent’s re-
buttals: each objection is met by both a substitution and a cancellation (P2a and
P2′a for O1a and P2c and P2′c for O1c), and a rebuttal of the counterexample
through a “transformation”, which means that substitutions and cancellations
can transform the case into a precedent for the proponent’s side.
Table 2. Cases in the Example From [42]
Case Outcome Plaintiff Factors Defendant Factors
Deceived P F6p F26p F10d F24d
NoMeasures D F2p F10d F24d
Bribed TBA F2p F6p F10d F16d
The diagram in Figure 1 offers an explanation for a plaintiff win in Bribe.
Deceived matches because the plaintiff took security measures (F6p) and dis-
closed information to outsiders (F10d). The defendant can now cite distinc-
tions of both kinds: deception (F26p) was not used, and the information is re-
engineerable (F16d) in the new case but not the precedent. Moreover NoMeasures
also matches on two factors and so is as on point as Deceived and so can serve
as a counter example. To counter O1a the plaintiff now argues (P2a) that the
lack of deception does not matter because bribery was used (F2p) and this can
substitute for F26p. Alternatively it can be argued (P2′a) that the additional
defendant factor in the precedent, F24d, that the information was available else-
where, cancels the additional plaintiff strength of the precedent coming from
bribery. It is clear in this case that the substitution is more effective: bribery
and deception play similar roles, both being different examples of the use of
improper means. In the case of the additional defendant factor in the new case,
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F16d, used in O1c, it can be substituted by the additional factor in the prece-
dent, F24d (P2b), or cancelled by the additional plaintiff factor, F2p (P2′b).
Again it seems that substitution is the better argument because of the similarity
of the roles of F16d and F24d.
The fact that the substitutions are clearly better rebuttals than the cancel-
lations (in this case: for other examples the reverse will be true) highlights a
problem with the explanation. Although the arguments generated by the defi-
nitions are possible arguments in that they conform to the definitions of [42],
they lack plausibility because they relate to entirely different concerns. That is,
these objections fail to make sense in domain terms. In CATO the strength of
a downplay depended on how close the factors were in the factor hierarchy. In
Figure 1, however, it is not possible to tell which rebuttal succeeded, or whether
a combination of the two was required. All the candidate arguments are pre-
sented, but it is the user that must supply the domain knowledge to assess how
strong these arguments are, and which objections and rebuttals should succeed
in the particular case. The reason for the decision is there, but the user must
extract it. In order to guide the user, we turn to consider the knowledge of the
structure of the domain represented by the use of issues.
4 Issues
In CATO the top level of the factor hierarchy was made up of issues. The role of
issues in a case is to identify the salient points that need to be shown in order to
prove or defend a case, and, hence, the factors that are relevant to the different
points. Issues in CATO served mainly to organise the explanation. CATO iden-
tified two main issues for Trade Secret misappropriation: the information had to
be a trade secret (with the burden of proof on the defendant to show that it was
not) and the information had to have been misappropriated (with the burden of
proof on the plaintiff). Below these main issues were sub-issues. To be a trade
secret the information had to be valuable and its secrecy adequately maintained.
If the information was used, misappropriation could be shown either through a
breach of confidence or through the use of improper means by the defendant.
For a breach of confidence a confidential relation between plaintiff and defen-
dant had to exist. Issues took on an additional significance when CATO was
adapted to predict outcomes in the IBP system [19] when the issues formed a
top layer of necessary and sufficient conditions (termed the logical model in [19]),
with factor based reasoning used to determine the status of the leaf issues. This
structure, strict logical rules at the top with case based reasoning to determine
which rules applied, was earlier used in CABARET [51], and was later adopted
and adapted to accommodate his value judgement formalism by Grabmair [27].
Figure 2 shows top level logical model and the allocation of factor to issues in
[27]3.
3 We use structure of the logical model in [27] which differs slightly from that of [19].
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Fig. 2. Issues and Factors From [27]. Factors may relate to more than one issue.
We can now consider the example cases in Table 2 in terms of issues. We also
include in Table 3 some other actual cases we will mention in this paper4.
4 Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So.2d 130 (Ala.Civ.App.1987), Leo Silfen, Inc.
v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, Computer Print Systems v. Lewis, 422 A.2d 148 (1980),
K & G Oil Tool & Service Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782,
(1958),College Watercolor Group, Inc. v. William H. Newbauer, Inc., 468 Pa. 103,
360 A.2d 200 (1976), Arco Industries Corp. v. Chemcast Corp., 633 F.2d 435, 208
USPQ 190 (6th Cir.1980), E. V. Prentice Dryer Co. v. Northwest Dryer & Machinery
Co., 246 Or. 78, 424 P.2d 227 (1967), Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil Refining
Co. 150 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Tex. 1956). Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., USA, 657
F.Supp. 319 (1987), Commonwealth v. Robinson, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 470, 388 N.E.2d
705 (1979), MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 112 Ill.App.3d 229, 445 N.E.2d 418, 67
Ill.Dec. 938 (1983), A. H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corporation, 380 F.2d 11
(1968), Ecologix, Inc. v. Fansteel, Inc., 676 F.Supp. 1374 (1988), Laser Industries,
Ltd. v. Eder Instrument Co., 573 F.Supp. 987 (1983), Sandlin v. Johnson, 152 F.2d 8
(8th Cir.1945), Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.1993),
Ferranti Electric, Inc. v. Harwood, 43 Misc.2d 533, 251 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1964), The
Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation, 108 Wash.2d 38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987).
Note that the analysis into factors is mine, and for the purpose of illustration in this
paper. It should not be relied on in a court of law.
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Table 3. Cases with Factors Grouped by Issue.












Deceived P F6p F10d F24d F26p
NoMeasures D F10d F24d F2p
Bribed ? F6p F10d F6p F16d F2p
Mason P F6p F15p F6p F16d F1d F21p
Silfen D F6p F11d F6p F21p
Lewis P F8p F1d F21p
College P F15 F26p F1d
Arco P F16d F20d F10d
Sheets D F19d F27d F18p
Robinson D F10d F19d F26p F1d F18p
MBL D F6p F20d F4p F5d F6p F10d F1d F4p F5d F13p
Prentice D F6p F24d F6p F3d
Kinnera-Weed D F6p F6p F25d F21p F25d
Emery P F6p F10d F21p F18p
Laser P F6p F6p F10d F12p F1d F21p F18p
Sandlin D F6p F16d F6p F10d F1d
Ecologix D F1d F21p F23d
Trandes P F6p F4p F6p F10p F12p F1d F21p
Ferranti D F20d F2p S17d
Boeing P F15p F10d F12p F1d F21p F18d
4.1 Explanation in CATO
CATO organised its explanation in terms of issues. The explanation of the exam-
ple in [42] would be something like the following (adapted from the explanation
of Mason given in Figure 2.4 of [3]).
Argument for Plaintiff in Bribed.
Plaintiff should win a claim of trade secrets misappropriation. Plaintiff’s
information is a trade secret and defendant acquired plaintiff’s informa-
tion through improper means.
Plaintiff’s information is a trade secret.
In Bribed, plaintiff adopted security measures [F6p] This shows that
plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information.
The fact that plaintiff disclosed its information to outsiders [F10d] does
not preclude a conclusion that plaintiff’s information is a trade secret.
This is especially so where, as in Bribed, plaintiff took security measures
to protect the information [F6p]. [Deceived ]
The fact that plaintiff’s information could be ascertained by examining
or reverse engineering plaintiff’s product [F16d] does not preclude a con-
clusion that plaintiff’s information is a trade secret [Mason]. Moreover
in Deceived, the information was available elsewhere, which is not the
case in Bribed.
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Defendant acquired plaintiff’s information through improper
means by bribing an employee [F2p].
NoMeasures is not a counterexample with respect to secrecy being
maintained, since in that case, unlike Bribed, the plaintiff did not take
security measures to protect the secrecy of its information.
Organising by issues has several advantages. First it means that differences
relating to uncontested issues are not considered: since the use of improper means
is not contested, it does not matter which factor is used to establish it. This
prunes the O1a branch from the tree in Figure 1. Second when downplaying the
genuine distinction in O1c, it produces the correct rebuttal (P2c) because this
is the factor related to the same issue, and ignores P2′c. Also it explicitly cites
the preference for F6p in past precedents as the reason for citing the precedent
and rejecting the counterexample.
The preference for F6p over F16d is justified by reference to Mason. Two
points should be made here: the misappropriation in Mason involved breach of
confidence rather than improper means. This does not matter when using issues,
but would provide a distinction for an approach without issues as used in [29]
and [41]. This is true of the reason as well as the results model: F2p would have
to be included in the reason for Mason, since otherwise there would have been no
breach of confidence. Using issues to organise our factors enables reasoning with
portions of precedents [15], which makes substantially more precedents available
to make points. On the results model, even with issues, however, Mason would be
vulnerable to a distinction since it contains F15p whereas Bribed does not, which
provides an additional factor to outweigh F16d, suggesting that F6p might not
be preferred to F16d on its own. If we consider the decision in Mason, however,
we read:
We note that absolute secrecy is not required ... for the recipe for Lynch-
burg Lemonade to constitute a trade secret — ”a substantial element of
secrecy is all that is necessary to provide trade secret protection.” Drill
Parts, 439 So.2d at 49. The defendants also contend that Mason’s recipe
was not a trade secret because it could be easily duplicated by others.
... We do not think, however, that this evidence in and of itself could
prevent such a conclusion. Rather, this evidence should be weighed and
considered along with the evidence tending to show the existence of a
trade secret. In this regard, we note that courts have protected informa-
tion as a trade secret despite evidence that such information could be
easily duplicated by others competent in the given field. KFC Corp. v.
Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.Ind. 1985); Sperry Rand Corp.
v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D.Conn. 1964).
Here there is no reference to the uniqueness of the product (F15p), and so
for the reason model we should take it that the decision in favour of Mason
indicates that F6p is preferred to F16d on its own, without needing the support
of F15p, and so Mason is available for use in Bribed when the reason model is
applied at the issue level. Note, however, that if we are using the distribution of
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factors across issues in [27] that was shown in Figure 2, this would require us to
consider the preference at the level of the TradeSecret issue and that InfoValuable
is not required for the information to be a trade secret when F6p is present. We
prefer instead to include F6p under InfoValuable as well as MaintainSecrecy:
sufficient secrecy measures are considered enough to justify the information being
deemed valuable. A factor can relate to more than one issue: for example F25d in
Figure 2. Putting F6p under InfoValuable to oppose F16d seems to accord with
the decision in Mason cited above. This enables us to continue to use the logical
model of [19] and [27] which requires Bribed to show both that the information
was valuable and that efforts to maintain secrecy had been taken. Without F6p
being included under InfoValuable this model would fail since that there is no
factor to contest the claim that F16d would mean that the information lacked
value.
4.2 The Centrality of Issues
From the above discussion we see that organising explanations around issues
provides focus and enables irrelevant factors and uncontested issues to be ig-
nored, so avoiding swamping the recipient of the explanation with an excess
of information. This accords with the widespread popularity of the Issue-Rule-
Application-Conclusion (IRAC) methodology of legal analysis. IRAC is widely
taught in law schools5, although often there are variants which include an addi-
tional item or reorder the items, perhaps beginning with the conclusion. IRAC
was advocated for the explanation of outcomes from factor based reasoning in
[8]. ”Issue spotting” has a long history in AI and Law, dating back to the work
of Gardner [23] and puesued by Gordon [24] and [25].
The question arises, however, as to what should be counted as an issue. Issues
could be very coarse grained such as was the information a trade secret?, or relate
to the fine grained abstract factors of the CATO factor hierarchy, such as did the
plaintiff take adequate security measures with respect to the defendant?. In the
next section we will offer a tree of issues in the form of an Abstract Dialectical
Framework (ADF) [18] as used for the representation of legal knowledge in [1].
5 An ADF of Issues
Table 4 presents the issues used to decide questions of Trade Secret Misappropri-
ation in the form of an ADF. The decomposition of InfoMisappropriated follows
[27] as shown in Figure 2 rather than [19]. Traditionally models of reasoning with
legal precedents include the rule model and the balance of factors model [52].
5 For example, City University of New York (https://www.law.cuny.edu/legal-
writing/students/irac-crracc/irac-crracc-1/) and Elizabeth Haub School of Law
at Pace University (https://academicsupport.blogs.pace.edu/2012/10/26/the-case-
of-the-missing-a-in-law-school-you-cant-get-an-a-without-an-a/). Use of IRAC is
advocated by the LexisNexis survival guide for law students available at
https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/students/law/.
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Table 4. ADF for Trade Secret Misapproriation
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ACCEPT IF F17d OR F25d
REJECT
Kinnear-Weed
Although CATO style reasoning relflects the balance of factors model, the ADF
in Table 4 uses the rule model in all the acceptance conditions, assuming that
there are sufficient precedents to justify the priorities in every node. In Table 4
the fourth column shows the justification for the acceptance condition: either
the logical model implied by the Restatement or a precedent which expressed a
particular preference6.
However, following the examples of CABARET [51] and Issue Based Pre-
diction (IBP) [19], at some point in each branch the rule model might not be
appropriate and so the balance of factors model would be required. This will
be particularly so in the early stages of the development of a body of case law,
6 Because the use of issues mean that at most five factors need to be considered for
any given node, it is feasible to envisage enough precedents to resolve the node. This
would not be so as the whole case level, where there are 226 possible models.
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when there will not yet be sufficient precedents to determine all the required
preferences. For example, F18p (Unique Product) may be a strong indication
that the information was used, but might not be as decisive as suggested in the
ADF in Table 4. If we use a balance of factors model we can choose between
balancing the factors representing the children of the node in question or the
factors which result from unfolding the nodes below the node concerned. Thus
InfoTradeSecret could be resolved by regarding InfoValuable and InfoTradeSe-
cret as a conjunction so that both must be true (rule model); or allowing some
trade off between them (coarse grained balance of factors), or balancing the rel-
evant base level factors {F6p, F8p, F10d, F12p, F11d, F15p, F16d, F19d, F20d,
F24d, F27d} (fine grained balance of factors). Also perhaps a mixed granularity
could be used, grouping some of the base level factors into abstract factors, e.g.
F10d and F12p could be considered together as MeasuresOutsiders. It would be
an interesting exercise to see what effect these different granularities might have,
but for this paper we will assume a mature domain allowing us to use a pure
rule model.
5.1 Using Issues for Explanation
Now we have the ADF, we can identify the issues in particular cases. The issues
in a case will be the lowest nodes spanning both a pro-plaintiff factor and a
pro-defendant factor. We illustrate this principle by applying it to the cases in
Table 2:
In Deceived MaintainSecrecy is an issue because Security Measures (F6p)
favours the plaintiff whereas MeasuresOutsiders favours the defendant (F10d).
Deceived was found for the plaintiff, and so MeasuresOutsiders ≺ F6p. We could
use Emery as a precedent to justify this preference. InfoValuable is also an issue
because it contains both F6p and F24d. Again since the plaintiff won we can
infer that InfoAvailableElsewhere ≺ F6p, a preference justified by Mason.
In IRAC terms:
An issue is whether that there were no efforts to maintain secrecy with
respect to outsiders means that secrecy was not maintained. The rule is
that Not MeasuresOutsiders ≺ F6p (Emery). Application is that Not
MeasuresOutsiders applies because F10d is present, but F6p is also
present. Therefore secrecy was maintained. A second issue is whether
that the information was obtainable elsewhere means that the informa-
tion was not valuable. The rule is InfoAvailableElsewhere ≺ F6p (Ma-
son). The rule applies because F24d establishes InfoAvailableElsewhere
and F6 is present. Therefore, the information was valuable.
In NoMeasures only the root node, TradeSecretMisappropriation, spans con-
tested factors. Here the defendant can establish that the information is not a




The issue is whether a Trade Secret was misappropriated, when the in-
formation was misappropriated but not a trade secret. The rule is if not
InfoTradeSecret then not TradeSecretMisappropriation (Restatement of
Torts). The rule applies because the information was obtainable else-
where because F24d was present (Ferranti) and the efforts to maintain
secrecy with respect to outsiders were inadequate because F10d is present
(Arco). Therefore there was no TradeSecretMisappropriation.
In Bribed we have a situation similar to Deceived except that InfoAvailableElse-
where is established by F16d rather than F24d. The IRAC explanation is thus
similar.
An issue is whether in there were inadequate efforts to maintain se-
crecy with respect to outsiders means that secrecy was not maintained.
The rule is that MeasuresOutsiders ≺ F6p (cf Deceived). Application is
that MeasuresOutsiders applies because F10d is present, but F6p is also
present. Therefore secrecy was maintained. A second issue is whether
that the information was obtainable elsewhere means that the informa-
tion was not valuable. The rules is InfoAvailableElsewhere ≺ F6p (Ma-
son). The rule applies because F16d establishes InfoAvailableElsewhere
and F6 is present. Therefore, the information was valuable.
In Mason there are two issues. The first, InfoValuable, is the what sets our
precedent for InfoAvailableElsewhere ≺ F6p. The second relates to whether there
was notice of confidentiality with both F1d and F21p present. The answer is that
there was because F1d ≺ F21p, established in Laser.
In IRAC terms:
An Issue is whether that the information was obtainable elsewhere means
that the information was not valuable. The rule used by this court is
InfoAvailableElsewhere≺ F6p. The rule applies because F26d establishes
InfoAvailableElsewhere and F6 is present. Therefore, the information
was valuable. A second issue is whether there was notice of confidentiality
where information was disclosed in negotiations and the defendant knew
the information to be confidential. The rule is F1d ≺ F21p (Laser).
The rule applies because F1d and F21p are present. Therefore there was
notice of confidentiality.
Whereas the explanations from [3] and [42] begin at the top level and work
down to the decisive facts, the IRAC explanations begin with the decisive facts.
The IRAC explanations are thus very focused and do not aspire to give an
exhaustive account, dotting every ‘i’ and crossing every ’t’, but instead home in
on what mattered in the particular case. As such they assume that the person
to whom the explanation will have some knowledge of the domain. A person
familiar withe logical model in Figure 2 or, better yet, the nodes of the ADF
in Table 4 will have no difficulty in seeing why these points matter and how
they decide the case. This suppression of shared background to highlight the
decisive considerations was one of the original motivations for argument based
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explanation [13]. For those who need or want a fuller explanation, a dialogue
seeking summary information in the manner of [12] can be initiated. Thus asking
SO? will display the parent node of the issue and asking WHY ? will display a
child node.
Thus for Bribed asking SO? for the first issue will produce Secrecy was Main-
tained. Asking SO? again will produce The Information was a Trade Secret. A
third SO? will produce The Trade Secret was Misppropriated. Now a series of
WHY? s will produce The Information Was Misapproriated, There Was Wron-
going, There was an Illegal Act and finally The Information Was Obtained by
Deception. Of course the users may stop the flow of information when they have
enough to see the correctness of the solution.
5.2 The Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation, 108 Wash.2d
38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987)
We will now give a full example, using Boeing7. Boeing is a very well known
aircraft manufacturer. They do not, however, make all the parts themselves, but
sub-contract certain components. One such component was the 7/7/7 cockpit
windows. Five of these windows lie on each side of the aircraft’s nose, each per-
forming multiple critical functions such as defogging, withstanding cabin pres-
surisation, and providing a clear range of vision. The three major suppliers of
aircraft windows in the United States are PPG Industries, Inc.; Swedlow, Inc.;
and Sierracin. Sierracin had supplied Boeing with other products for many years.
Boeing’s drawings for the 7/7/7 cockpit windows are unique, detailed blueprints
containing approximately 500 critical tolerances, dimensions, specifications and
material requirements. Boeing helped Sierracin enter the 7/7/7 window market
by providing Sierracin with FAA authorized drawings, technical assistance and
tooling, and by awarding it contracts for some of Boeing’s 7/7/7 window needs
in 1982 and 1983.
In 1984 after alleged breaches of contract because of late deliveries of win-
dows, Boeing chose not to renew contracts with Sierracin, and instead signed
a 5-year 100 percent requirements contract with PPG Industries, Inc. Sierracin
decided, however, to continue manufacturing windows for sale on its own in the
7/7/7 “after market” (i.e., spare parts market). As a supplier, Sierracin received
Boeing’s requests for quotations, which provided that all orders were subject to
its confidential terms and conditions. Boeing alleged that Sierracin misappropri-
ated its trade secrets concerning the design of aeroplane windows.
Sierracin signed over 270 contracts with Boeing, each containing the fol-
lowing language: “Confidential Disclosure. Seller shall keep confidential . . . all
proprietary information”.
The defence was that the information was not a trade secret because it had
been disclosed to outsiders (F10d) and had not been misappropriated because it
had been disclosed to Sierracin in negotiations (F1d). This was countered by the
7 The description of the case is based on the opinion of Justice Dore, available at
https://casetext.com/case/boeing-company-v-sierracin-corporation.
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explicit confidentiality agreement that Boeing required suppliers to sign (F12p),
and that Sierracin were well aware of the confidential nature of the information
(F21p). The court found for Boeing.
The explanation based on the above proposal would look like this:
The Boeing Company v. Sierracin Corporation, 108 Wash.2d
38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987).
The decision is for the plaintiff. There are two issues:
1. Whether adequate measures with respect to outsiders were taken
when the information was disclosed to outsiders, but these disclo-
sures were restricted. The rule is Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders≺Outsider-
Disclosures-Restricted (Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996
F.2d 655 (4th Cir.1993)). The rule applies because F10d and F12p
are present. Therefore, adequate measures with respect to outsiders
were taken.
2. Whether there was notice of confidentiality when the information
was disclosed in negotiations, but the defendant knew that the in-
formation was confidential. The rule is Disclosure-In-Negotiations
≺ Knew-Info-Confidential (Laser Industries,Ltd. v. Eder Instrument
Co., 573 F.Supp. 987 (1983)). The rule applies because F1d and F21p
are present. Therefore, there was notice of confidentiality,
The user may now interrogate the system further to help in understanding
why these issues matter.
Issue 1: So?
Reply 1: Secrecy was Maintained (Restatement of Torts section 757,
comment(b), bullet 3).
Reply 1: So?
Reply 2: The information was a Trade Secret (Restatement of Torts
section 757, comment(b).
Reply 2: Why?
Reply 3: The information was valuable. (Restatement of Torts section
757, comment(b), bullet 3).
Reply 3: Why?
The issue was unopposed. Further the product was unique (F15p).
Satisfied as to Issue 1, the user now turns to issue 2.
Issue 2: So?
Reply 4: There was a Confidential Relationship (Restatement of Torts,
section 757(b).
Reply 4: So?
Reply 5: The Information Was Misappropriated (Restatement of Torts,
Section 757, General Principle).
OK
Since the user knows that the plaintiff should win if the information was a
trade secret and misappropriated, the dialogue is terminated here.
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6 Discussion
In this section we will consider three points: the quality of the explanations; the
implications for accounts of precedential constraint; and how to accommodate
dimensional facts.
6.1 Quality of Explanation
In his illuminating survey on explanation [39], Miller identifies four features of
good explanations. These are:
– Explanations are contrastive. As well as explaining why a particular classifi-
cation is appropriate, a good explanation will also say why other classifica-
tions are not, often using counterfactuals and hypotheticals.
– Explanations are selective. Rarely is a logically complete explanation pro-
vided, but rather only the most salient points are presented unless more
detail is required by the recipient of the explanation. The assumption is that
there will be a considerable degree of shared background knowledge, and so
the explanation need only point to some fact or rule as yet unknown to the
recipient.
– Explanations are rarely in terms of probabilities. Using statistical generali-
sations to explain why events occur is unsatisfying since they do not explain
the generalisation itself. Moreover, the explanation typically applies to a sin-
gle case, and so would require some explanation of why that particular case
is typical.
– Explanations are social. Explanations involve a transfer of knowledge, be-
tween particular people in a particular situation and so are relative to the
explainer’s beliefs about the explainee’s beliefs.
The explanations produced by using issues as described above have these
features. The explanation is contrastive because it begins with the issue which
will include a factor for the other side, and so suggests why the decision would
have gone otherwise had the preferred factor for the winning side not been
present. They are selective because they begin by stating the particular reason
for the decision, and offers any further explication of the background knowledge
explaining exactly why this matters only on request. Like most explanations in
law, no probabilities are used: specific precedents are used to justify the rules
rather than some degree of support as in, for example, association rule mining
[53]. Finally the explanation is social in that it adopts a form of explanation
(IRAC) that is widely used in the legal community which transfers knowledge
in a way tailored to the situation and the user. The particular strength of the
proposed method is perhaps its selectivity, which contrasts with the dialogue
proposed in [42] which included all available arguments and objections, and the
explanations in [3] and [1] which again covered every aspect without regard as
to what the user might already know.
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6.2 Implications for Precedential Constraint
The increased effectiveness of formal characterisations of precedential constraint
when applied at the issue level rather than at the whole case level was discussed
in [11]. A problem with the results model was that, given, the large, number of
factors, there are so many possible case descriptions (226) that it is all too easy
to avoid the constraint of a precedent by pointing to a distinguishing factor.
The use of the reason model alleviates this problem to some extent, but far from
completely, as illustrated in [11]. However, the number of possible case descrip-
tions at the issue level is greatly reduced. Examination of Table 4 shows that
no node has more than five children and so no node would require more than 32
cases to be fully resolved. Many of the nodes would require fewer: MeasuresOut-
siders, measures for example has only two children, so that there are only four
distinct case descriptions. Actually only three of these are possible, since F12p
(restrictions placed on outsider disclosures) cannot be present without F10d
(disclosures to outsiders). Also some precedents can be used for several nodes:
the cases of MeasuresOutsiders required in MaintainSecrecy can also be used to
resolve MeasuresOutsiders itself. This being so, fewer than 150 precedents would
be required to resolve the tree completely, even on the results model. This num-
ber could be substantially reduced by applying the reason model to the issues.
Since IBP [19] used over 180 cases, it would seem that this might be a feasible
way of addressing the problem. Moreover, various Machine Learning approaches
use even bigger datasets: over 15,000 were available to [17]. If we have a dataset
already available in a form in which factors can be straightforwardly ascribed
- as might be expected when decisions are made on the basis of an application
form, which is common in fields such as welfare benefits - or we have a machine
learning program which ascribes factors as in [17], we can apply this approach
if we can associate these factors with issues. This should enable us to learn the
acceptance conditions for the nodes using a variety of ML techniques, including
such traditional techniques as rule induction [40].
The above suggests that whether we are using precedents for explanation or
for learning, they are best considered in terms of issues rather than as whole
cases.
6.3 Factors With Magnitude
The above presents a rather sanguine view of the possibility of predicting legal
decisions, suggesting that a couple of hundred cases should enable the identi-
fication of a set of rules that would give complete accuracy. Leaving aside the
many problems with any approach predicting legal decisions on the basis of a set
of past cases, including that the law is constantly evolving so that predictions
based on old data become unreliable [37] and that any collection of precedents is
likely to contain decisions that were biased or incorrect, there is another serious
problem. The above has assumed that, as in [3], factors are either present or
absent, and can be ascribed to cases unequivocally. In practice, however, this is
not so. Consider the Restatement of Torts:
Using Issues to Explain Legal Decisions 17
Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information
is one’s trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is
known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures
taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of
the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort
or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease
or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others. Emphasis mine.
From this it is clear that many of the aspects are not simply present or absent,
but are present or absent to some degree and so require some judgement as to
whether they were present to a degree sufficient to permit the ascription of the
factor. It should be remembered that the factors used in CATO derive from the
dimensions proposed in HYPO ([47] and [4]). Dimensions were aspects of a case
which could, if applicable, take a range of values which would increasingly favour
a particular party. The relationship between dimensions and factors is discussed
in [48] and [11]. In fact, in HYPO, ten of the thirteen dimensions could take only
two values and so either were inapplicable or favoured one of the parties. For
example, the bribery dimension either favoured the plaintiff if bribery had taken
place, or was inapplicable. It therefore maps straightforwardly to a single factor,
F2p. Three of the dimensions did, however, span a rage of values. Competitive
Advantage was either inapplicable, neutral, or favoured the plaintiff, mapping to
F8p. Disclosures to Outsiders was inapplicable if there had been no disclosures,
or favoured the defendant if there had been sufficient disclosures (F10d) and
neutral otherwise. Note, however, that extreme pro-defendant values on this
dimension gave rise to the the more powerful factor F27d when the information
was considered in the public domain. This is important because a plaintiff factor
might be preferred to F10d, but not F27d. This is true of F6p in Table 4. The
most interesting dimension is security measures. At one end this favours the
defendant and so maps into F19d, whereas at the other it maps into F6p and
favours the plaintiff. It is thus always applicable. Many cases, however, contain
neither F19d nor F6p, suggesting that the middle of the range is neutral so that
no factor is applicable. Note that where a dimension can favour both sides, two
distinct factors are used: this is because in general the absence of factor is not a
reason to decide for the other side. The was explained by Rissland and Ashley
in [48]:
[...] the Security-Measures dimension was broken into two factors: Security-
Measures [F6p], favoring the plaintiff, and No-Security-Measures [F19d],
favoring the defendant. This was done because judges explicitly said
that the fact that plaintiff had taken no security measures was a positive
strength for the opponent. By contrast, Ashley and Aleven did not create
a “No-Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders” factor because they found no cases
where judges had said that the absence of any disclosures to outsiders
was a positive strength for the plaintiff. ([48], p 69).
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Most of the CATO factors derive from two valued dimensions and so can be
considered either present or absent, and so do not require special consideration.
The three factors deriving from dimensions with ranges of value, however, do
need something more. Horty in [30] and [31] introduced the notion of factors
with magnitude, and discussed how these could be accommodated in a theory
of precedential constraint. Rigoni addressed this problem in [46], and Horty
modified his approach in [32]. A comparison of their approaches is given in [42].
Although this was taken in [42] to imply that precedential constraint should be
expressed in terms of dimensions rather than factors, it was argued in [11] that
this is perhaps not the best approach. We will explain how we can accommodate
dimensions in an account of precedential constraint based on factors.
Many have seen reasoning with legal cases as a two stage process: first factors
are assigned on the basis of the facts in a cases, and then these factors are
considered in the the light of precedent cases to see whether the decision is
constrained. This two stage approach is described in [44]
Once the facts of a case have been established - and this is rarely straight-
forward since the move from evidence to facts is often itself the subject of
debate - legal reasoning can be seen, following Ross [49] and Lindhal and
Odelstad [36], as a two stage process, first from the established facts to
intermediate predicates, and then from these intermediate predicates to
legal consequences. CATO has been explicitly identified with the second
of these steps (e.g. [19]). ([44], p 22).
This approach has been used not only in [44], but also in [5] and further
advocated in [17] and [16].
If we adopt this two stage model, we can see factors with magnitude as fac-
tors deriving from a dimension with more than two values. It may, like Security
Measures, favour either side, with a neutral area in which no factor is applicable,
or, like disclosures, give rise to two factors favouring the same side with different
strengths, as with F10p and F27p. Now we must determine which factor, if any,
should be ascribed in a particular case given that it lies at a certain point on
the range (termed by Horty a dimensional fact). This can be determined by
precedents using either the results model or the reason model [31]. Rigoni pro-
posed that precedents should be regarded as identifying switching points on the
dimensions, the points at which factors come to be, and cease to be, applicable.
The fact that whether a factor is applicable or not is itself be debatable, com-
plicates the first stage of the process. However, once the set of applicable factors
has been identified, the second stage can proceed as described above.
Another, perhaps more serious, problem is that these factors may not be
independent. For example, cases arise which require balancing the interests of
the state in enabling the enforcement of laws with the privacy interests of its
citizens [14]. In such cases it may seem necessary to trade off one factor against
another, so that the more serious the suspected crime the greater the intrusion
on privacy that is justified. Such balancing of interests has been discussed in [35]
and [26]. We would, however, in line with the two stage approach, follow [10]
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Fig. 3. Trade off between absence and income
and see the question not as a balance between factors, but as a question of the
ascription of factors on the basis of dimensional facts, so that factors themselves
can continue to be seen as independent.
The example in [31] concerns change of fiscal domicile. Among other things
to be considered are the length of stay abroad and the percentage of income
earned abroad. The longer the absence and the greater the amount, the more
change is favoured. We may now have a decision where an absence of 36 months
and earnings of 60% favoured change, while an absence of 48 months but only
20% earnings favoured no change. This suggests that absence and income are
not independent, but trade off against each other. Suppose we have a third case
also with 20% earnings, but an absence of 60 months, further indicating the
existence of a trade off.
The suggestion in [10] is to introduce a factor ascribed to the case on the basis
of the dimensional facts recording absence and income. In this case a suitable
factor would be IncomeSufficientGivenAbsence and would favour change. Each
precedent for change will block off an area where the factor definitely applies,
and each precedent for the defendant will block off an area where the factor
definitely does not apply. This is shown in Figure 3. We can now fit a line to the
points and suggest that the factor applies to points north east of the line and
does not apply to points south west of the line. A possible line (y = 120− 10x:
designed to just include both precedents) is shown in Figure 3. Of course, other
lines are possible, and the function need not be linear, and so any unconstrained
point may be the subject of debate as to whether or not the precedent applies.
The composite factor will appear as a node in the ADF with the dimensional
facts as its children and the equation will define the acceptance condition. This
node can be treated as an issue for explanation purposes.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have discussed several reasons why cases are better seen as
bundles of issues than as bundles of factors. The issues will be the bundles of
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factors. Thinking in terms of issues improves explanations by enabling them
to focus on what was disputed and what is significant in the particular case
under consideration, and to be expressed in the IRAC form widely taught in law
schools. Using issues also greatly enhances factor based precedential constraint
by eliminating irrelevant distinctions. The importance of issues for prediction
was indicated by the central role given to issues in systems designed to predict
legal decisions based on factors such as [19] ad [28], and is discussed in detail in
[11].
Developing good factor based explanations is of current importance because
of the increased use of machine learning approaches for predicting legal decisions.
Explanations are essential because of the right to explanation and to encourage
acceptance of these predictions. But they also have relevance to the responsible
use of such systems: machine learning approaches are vulnerable to changes in
the law and social attitudes, and the bias that may exist in the past decisions.
Good explanations will help to detect decisions based on reasons which are no
longer applicable, and decisions based on reasons that exhibit bias. Explanation
can therefore apply a corrective influence essential to the responsible use of
Machine Learning in law.
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